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Background: Since 2005, the Qinghai-like lineage of the highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus H5N1 has rapidly
spread westward to Europe, the Middle East and Africa, reaching a dominant level at a global scale in 2006.
Methods: Based on a combination of genetic sequence data and H5N1 outbreak information from 2005 to 2011,
we use an interdisciplinary approach to improve our understanding of the transmission pattern of this particular
clade 2.2, and present cartography of global spatiotemporal transmission footprints with genetic characteristics.
Results: Four major viral transmission routes were derived with three sources— Russia, Mongolia, and the Middle
East (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia)—in the three consecutive years 2005, 2006 and 2007. With spatiotemporal
transmission along each route, genetic distances to isolate A/goose/Guangdong/1996 are becoming significantly
larger, leading to a more challenging situation in certain regions like Korea, India, France, Germany, Nigeria and
Sudan. Europe and India have had at least two incursions along multiple routes, causing a mixed virus situation. In
addition, spatiotemporal distribution along the routes showed that 2007/2008 was a temporal separation point for
the infection of different host species; specifically, wild birds were the main host in 2005–2007/2008 and poultry
was responsible for the genetic mutation in 2009–2011. “Global-to-local” and “high-to-low latitude” transmission
footprints have been observed.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that both wild birds and poultry play important roles in the transmission of the
H5N1 virus clade, but with different spatial, temporal, and genetic dominance. These characteristics necessitate that
special attention be paid to countries along the transmission routes.
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The hemagglutinin (HA) segment of H5N1 highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) virus has been reported to
have 10 distinguished clades ranging from 0 to 9 [1].
Among these, the Qinghai-like lineage (clade 2.2) was the
quickest to evolve, with a fourth-order sub-clade up to the
present. Moreover, of the many genetic clades circulating
in Asia, clade 2.2 is considered the only one that spread
westward to the Middle East, Europe and Africa [2],
reaching a dominant role with global range.
Much previous research has been completed and is of
considerable significance to our study. For instance,
some research works studying the virus transmission at* Correspondence: bingxu@tsinghua.edu.cn
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unless otherwise stated.nationwide and continent-wide spatial scope have been
conducted based upon phylogenetic evolution theory,
especially during 2005–2006 when the situation was se-
vere [3,4]. Moreover, new interdisciplinary efforts using
a combination of geospatial informatics and bioinformat-
ics approaches have been made to improve understanding
of global H5N1 transmission [5,6]. However, some limi-
tations of these works remain to be solved. First, most
research has focused on certain regions or small spatial
scales. For example, some works explore the transmis-
sion pattern only within a single country, such as India
[7,8], Egypt [9], Mongolia [10], the Russian Federation
[11], France [12], Germany [13], Switzerland [14], Burkina
Faso [3], Hungary [15], Bangladesh [16], and Kuwait
[17]. Other studies have remained focused within a spe-
cific continent, such as Africa [18,19]. The study of cross-
continent spread [2] is even less common, not to mentionhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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probes the transmission footprints among H5N1-infected
countries globally. In addition, other works concerning
clade 2.2 routes are relatively approximate, and appear to
have simplified the transmission pattern and underesti-
mated the complexity of this clade.
Given the significance of the Qinghai-like lineage and
lack of knowledge about its probable means of transmis-
sion, there is a need to investigate its geographic spread
mechanisms through investigating its underlying genetic
forcing. In this research, we examine potential global
transmission routes during 2005–2011, and the spatio-
temporal distribution features of outbreaks along these
routes. We also explore genetic mutation features rela-
tive to the isolate A/goose/Guangdong/1996 (Gs/Gd/96),




Global time-location series of H5N1 outbreaks, containing
11750 records from January 2005 through September
2011, were extracted from official reports of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (http://
www.fao.org). The associated variables and parameters of
H5N1 outbreaks are outbreak location, observation and
reporting date, and some descriptive information about
the corresponding host. Incomplete records, especially
those without location information, were labeled with
Google Earth, and the center of the available adminis-
trative region where the outbreak occurred was used
instead.
Outbreak data were used mainly to identify transmission
direction, especially when temporal information was un-
available for genetic sequences. These sequence records
were mainly from Egypt, Nigeria and Germany. The data
were also used to analyze the spatial and temporal host
distribution pattern along transmission routes.
Sequence data
GenBank of the National Center for Biotechnology
Information (NCBI) (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) has
collected and published HA and neuraminidase (NA)
sequence data of HPAI clades. From the database website,
we obtained global HPAI H5N1 full-length sequence data
from 2005 to 2011. This selected time period for the se-
quence data was in accordance with that of the H5N1 out-
break data. In addition to the basic sequence information,
year and location of the isolates and host data were also
collected. In practice, many genetic fragments were in-
complete. Therefore, only those segments with lengths
greater than 1600 base pairs were selected, for a total of
873 sequence data records of HA clade 2.2. Accession
numbers of the nucleotide sequences were provided(Additional file 1). Among the 873 sequences of the HA
genes, 83 are from humans, 580 are from poultry, and
210 are from wild birds. The number of sequences ob-
tained and used for each country is summarized in the
Additional file 2.
Using Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis (MEGA)
software version 4.0 [20], the collected sequence data were
initially aligned and compared. They were then combined
with the sequences in a small tree from the World Health
Organization (WHO) (http://www.who.int/en). The phylo-
genetic tree was constructed by both the maximum-
likelihood and neighbor-joining distance-based matrix al-
gorithms to ensure the identity of tree topology. For most
sequences, spatial and temporal information was available
on a country and year basis, respectively. Exceptions were
some isolates in geographically large countries such as
China and Russia, which had province-level information.
In this way, source articles of all sequences were referred
to and checked, to implement their detailed descriptions
in the sequence database. With this dataset of improved
accuracy, it was easier to match sequences with geospatial
data based on their spatial and temporal attributes; never-
theless, some temporal information was unavailable and
required supplementation by outbreak data in the follow-
ing analysis. In addition, sequence data were used to cal-
culate genetic distances to the Gs/Gd/96 isolate.
Construction of routes and paths
The terms route and path are used to illustrate the overall
and detailed transmission pattern of virus, respectively.
The former depicts the broad transmission mode and the
latter gives further regional spread information.
Generally, routes were constructed here in two steps;
namely, 10 paths were identified based on topology of
the phylogenetic tree, and these were then aggregated
into four possible routes.
The 10 paths, especially the transmission direction
between countries, were identified using the following
criteria. First, identification was done following the
“time order” criterion; in other words, it is assumed that
spread was from early-occurring viruses to those occur-
ring later. In addition, we followed the “distance order”
criterion. This is the assumption that the shorter the
distance to the root, the higher probability a virus has to
act as a source and infect others distant from the same
root. Last, a rule was established to identify the root in
the second criterion. Under certain circumstances, the
chronological order of viruses within the same group (a
set of isolates that share a parent node) may not be clear;
thus, if the first criterion was not in effect then the second
one, which requires definition of the root for a group, was
followed. In this case, two situations and two correspond-
ing solutions were found. Specifically, if there is a virus
whose distance to the parent node is (or nearly) zero, then
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has the closest distance to the parent node relative to
other viruses in the same group (Figure 1A and B). If
this is not the case or no such node exists, then the parent
node is regarded as the root of the group, and thus the
parent node of this parent node, looping until the root of
the entire tree is reached (Figure 1C).
According to the geographic locations of the studied
countries in each group, 10 paths were integrated into
four possible routes, based on the presumption that there
may be certain similarities among genetic sequences in
paths within the same countries.
Calculation and spatial distribution of genetic distance
Genetic distances to the Gs/Gd/96 isolate were calcu-
lated with the Kimura two-parameter model [20] in
MEGA version 4.0, using a gamma distribution (shape
parameter = 1) to model rate variation among sites.
Results were stored in matrix form.
The average genetic distance to Gs/Gd/96 along the ith
route, Di, represented the mean genetic mutation among
all regions on the ith route. The average genetic distance
to the Gs/Gd/96 isolate in the jth region on the ith route,
Dij, indicated mean genetic mutation within the jth region
on the ith route. If Dij >Di, the jth region was considered to
have a positive role in genetic mutation on the ith route, or
be a “key” region, and its geographic location was marked
for further analysis of the spatiotemporal distribution of
genetic mutation along routes.
Results
Paths and routes
Details of the 10 paths and four possible routes are
shown in Table 1, and the corresponding spatial attri-
butes are depicted in Figure 2. Arrow shapes in Table 1
are used to represent the criteria obeyed in identifying
the transmission direction between countries or regions.
No clear directions were found among countries in the
seventh path and the first half of the third route.
Spatially, clusters along the same route have the same
color system but varying colors, which illustrates notFigure 1 Rule of root identification. Red dot represents root of a group,
root identification depends on genetic distance of a virus strain to its fathe
(A) zero or (B) nearly zero, then this node is considered the root of the gro
other viruses in the same group. (C) If no such node exists, the father nodeonly the small difference (or certain similarities) among
those within-route paths, but also large among-route
distinctions.
Characteristics of spatiotemporal transmission
The first route is probably the most complex, and con-
sists of four paths. This route began from the Asian part
of Russia in 2005 and initially spread westward within
that country, reaching its European part in late 2005.
After this within-country spread, transmission split in
two directions, westward and southwestward. The former
trajectory reached France through the southern part of
Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary in 2006. In the
latter course, viruses from Romania and Turkey combined
in 2005 and spread to Africa in 2006 or, more precisely, to
Nigeria in February 2006. Transmission continued west
and east, affecting western African nations and Sudan in
the east. Thus, western Asia and eastern Europe may be
sources for Africa.
The source of the second route is viruses isolated in
Mongolia during May 2005, which then followed two
distinct paths. One of these impacted Korea and Japan,
and the other path spread westward to the Asian part of
Russia, and then southward to Qinghai, China, and India
over the two years, constructing links among Mongolian,
Russian, Qinghai, and Indian viruses during May 2005
through 2008.
In the third course, the direction of transmission be-
tween countries in the first half is unclear, but shows
potential relationships between viruses in southwest
Asian and European countries. However, in the second
half of this route, viruses originated in Italy in February
2006, affecting central and southern European countries
such as Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Austria almost
simultaneously. Several months later, the Czech Republic
and Germany were affected. Based on this transmission
route, Italy may be an origin for those central and
southern European countries.
The last footprint shows a distinct time and source fea-
ture relative to the aforementioned ones, i.e., many viruses
in this pathway were isolated in 2007, with a source inand red triangle shows root of an entire tree. For a specific group,
r node. If there is a virus strain whose distance to the father node is
up because it has the closest distance to the father node relative to
acts as the root, looping until the root of the entire tree is reached.
Table 1 Detailed transmission paths
Path Directions Route
a 05.2 Russia (Asian)→ 05.11-06 Russia (European)→ 05 Romania→ 06.2 Hungary & 05 Croatia
1
b 05 Russia (European)→ 06 Nigeria→ 06 Sudan & 06–07 West Africa
c 05 Romania & 05 Turkey→ 06.2 Austria & 06.2 Slovenia→ 06 France
d 05 Romania & 05 Turkey→ 06 Nigeria
e 06.5 Mongolia→ 06 Korea→ 07 Japan
2
f 06.5 Mongolia→ 06.6 Russia→ 07.4 Qinghai→ 08 India
g India – Iran – Russia – Italy
3
h 06.2 Italy→ 06.2-3 Slovenia & Austria & 06.2 Hungary & 06.2 Slovakia→ 06.4 Czech→ 06 Germany
i 07 Kuwait & 07 Saudi Arabia→ 07-11Bangladesh→ 08–10 India
4
j 07 Kuwait & 07 Saudi Arabia→ 07 Germany→ 07–08 other European countries
Arrow indicates transmission direction between two countries. Dashed line indicates that the direction of transmission is uncertain. The infected date is provided
afore the country name.
Figure 2 Four major global transmission routes of clade 2.2H5N1 avian influenza. Each color represents a single route with its corresponding
key regions. Colored patches show regions that have larger genetic distances along the route. Three probable sources, namely, Russia, Mongolia and
the Middle East (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) in three consecutive years (2005, 2006 and 2007), are indicated by a red, ring-shaped symbol.
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two sections; specifically, one spread east to Bangladesh
and India and another transect crosses western Europe,
affecting France, Austria, Germany, Poland, the Czech
Republic, and the UK. Thus, southwest Asia may be a
source for the viruses in Europe.
Based upon the description above, we found three main
sources; namely, the Asian part of Russia, Mongolia, and
southwest Asia (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), which have
clear spatial and temporal features. In particular, the first
two were responsible for the 2005–2006 transmission and
are in the northern part of Asia, whereas the third and
fourth in southwest Asia were related to spread in 2007
and 2008. European countries and India had at least two
virus incursions along multiple routes, producing a mixed
situation.
Spatial features of genetic mutation
The key regions of genetic mutation are illustrated in
Figure 2. It is clear that nearly all are located at the endFigure 3 Phylogenetic analysis of HA segment of clade 2.2 H5N1 influ
HA genes in four routes is shown by different color associated with its corr
with three possible sources shown in grey with country names annotated. Boof each path, which means that with spatiotemporal
transmission along the route, genetic distances relative
to Gs/Gd/96 are becoming much greater. This indicates
an ongoing evolution of viruses, causing a precarious
situation in certain regions such as Korea, India, France,
Germany, Nigeria, and Sudan.
Spatiotemporal distribution pattern of hosts
The distribution of hosts in clade 2.2 transmission
paths shows clear spatial and temporal patterns, with
2007/2008 as the important separation point (Figure 3
and 4). Spatially, viruses isolated from poultry are
mainly in East and South Asia, the Middle East and Africa,
with some sporadic occurrence in Central Europe such as
in Poland and Romania. For viruses isolated from wild
birds, the majority are in Europe and certain parts of Asia
(Qinghai, China and Mongolia), with sparse incidence in
Africa and some areas of Asia. Temporally, viruses that
were present in poultry lasted nearly through the entire
period of 2005–2011. In particular, India and Bangladeshenza viruses. Topology of phylogenetic relationship of studied 873
esponding route. The phylogenetic tree is rooted by Gs/Gd/96 isolate
otstrap values greater than 60 are marked at corresponding branches.
Figure 4 Spatial distribution of infected wild birds and poultry along four transmission routes. Isolates from wild birds and poultry are
shown respectively in blue and yellow bars, with bar height representing proportion of isolates in the hosts of wild birds and poultry.
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poultry operations, such as backyard poultry facilities
might be potential sources of virus exchange between
commercial poultry and wild birds. This is particularly
critical in wetland areas of southern and southeastern Asia
where backyard poultry have close contact with com-
mercial poultry and migratory birds, therefore increas-
ing the risk of contracting disease [21]. In contrast, wild
bird viruses were mainly present during 2005–2007,
and especially in 2006, after which there were only very
rare outbreaks in four countries: China, India, Bangladesh
and the UK. In summary, wild birds were the major vector
for the spread of viruses during 2005–2007, and caused
global infection and virus transmission. On the other
hand, poultry may have been responsible for the regional
virus transmission of 2008–2011.
In Figure 5, countries are arranged by latitudinal
order, and there is clear geo-temporal separation or a
high-to-low latitude transmission pattern. That is, vi-
ruses isolated from wild birds were clustered around
30°N and in northern regions before 2007; those iso-
lated from poultry were largely further south, in Egypt,Nigeria, India, Bangladesh and other countries, especially
after 2007.Discussion
Transmission directions and sources
We summarized four major transmission routes of the
clade 2.2 virus with three sources; namely, Russia,
Mongolia and the Middle East (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).
Based on the proposed criteria, we were able to establish
clear transmission directions between countries on three
routes, not just the similarities indicated by previous
works such as Ducatez et al. [19].
The east-spreading section to Bangladesh and India in
the last route may indicate that viruses in India during
2008 may be more precisely from Kuwait rather than
Bangladesh, as previously assumed [22]. In addition,
European countries had at least two virus incursions
with distinct spatiotemporal characteristics. Previous
findings that suggest differences between viruses iso-
lates before and after 2007 [13,22-24], even in the same
country, may confirm the present result that European
Figure 5 Timeline of emergence of clade 2.2 H5N1 influenza virus. A list of countries are ordered from higher latitude to lower latitude
ones. Isolates from wild birds and poultry are labeled in blue and yellow squares, respectively. The location of the bar indicates the month of the
outbreak occurred and its length reflects the corresponding duration (in months) of the outbreak.
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in different years.
Role of Indian and Italian viruses
In the foregoing analysis, India has two different sources
and Italy is recognized as one source for Europe. Never-
theless, given the uncertainty of transmission direction in
the first half of the third route, there may be underlying
relationships between southwest Asian and European
countries. In this case, India may have been the source
or pool of viruses in 2006, but strong evidence of this is
unavailable. It is likely that one or more countries on
the first half of this route may have acted as the source
in a more exact sense. Thus, whether Italy should be
treated as a source requires more consideration.
Egyptian isolates
It was found that Egypt had only a single virus introduc-
tion and was declared endemic in 2008. The origin or
source of these Egyptian isolates has not been identified,
although some research has indicated that they are of
Eurasian origin [25]. The present focus is on transmis-
sion routes, therefore the sources of these isolates are
important. Thus, the Egyptian isolates are not included
in any path, but the lack of these isolates in our four
routes does not mean that they are not crucial to main-
tenance and mutation of the virus.
Intersection and similarity of routes
As seen in Figure 3, isolates from along the four trans-
mission routes are not completely mutually independent.There is some intersection, especially among viruses iso-
lated in Nigeria, Turkey, Austria, Slovenia, and France in
the first path, and those in European countries in the
second half of the third route. Further, both routes even-
tually entered the European countries at nearly the same
time. This spatial and temporal similarity between the two
may be responsible for the intersection between isolates
on the two paths.
There are some similarities between the transmission
mode of the first clade 2.2 route and the global spread
process of H5N1 outbreaks [18]. That is, routes of clade
2.2 that spread westward to Europe and southward to
Africa may be identical to outbreak trajectories in these
two directions. This may be because that the west- and
south-spreading viruses from eastern Europe during
2005–2008 all belong to the 2.2 clade, or that this clade
is the only one that appears during this period and along
those transmission directions.
Host issues
As mentioned above, the first route covers the largest
geographic area relative to the other three. This large
spatial extent was generally facilitated by high infectivity
and a long infectious period [26]. In our study, chickens,
ducks and geese were the primary victims and they had
a wider spatial distribution than other host species,
which indicates greater infectivity. Moreover, migration
connects many bird populations in time and space along
major flyways, either at common breeding areas during
migration, or at stopover and wintering sites. This
provides ideal places for many species to aggregate at
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Also, virus-infected birds may transmit pathogens to
other populations that may subsequently move to new
areas [27]. This forms a “transmission relay” with a long
and continuous infectious period, which may reflect the
importance of migratory birds in the perpetuation and
spread of H5N1 viruses. The combination of experimental
exposure data and telemetry information has been used in
previous works to describe the intercontinental virus dis-
persion by a series of successively infected migratory birds
[28]. In addition, experimental studies have shown that
several bird species survive infection and shed the H5N1
virus without apparent disease signs. Even worse, HPAI
may retain high pathogenicity in chickens, in contrast to
the lower pathogenicity found in infected ducks [29]. This
asymptomatic spread in birds and pathogenicity differ-
ences in hosts may partly explain the circulation of viruses
and high death rate among chickens in Nigeria.
The emergence timeline of clade 2.2 (Figure 5) shows
only the emergence time of the clade in each country
during 2005–2011, and is distinguished by poultry and
wild birds. However, the number of outbreaks in each
month is not shown. Therefore, the difference in season-
ality of outbreak intensity between countries or hosts
(poultry and wild birds) is not reflected.
Analysis of spatiotemporal distribution of various
hosts along routes is done at the wild bird and poultry
level. Moreover, roles are addressed in light of amounts
and relative ratios of the two hosts in various spaces.
These analyses have limitations. First, humans are not
taken into consideration. H5N1 clade 2.2 human cases
are common, especially in Egypt, and sporadic viruses
have been isolated in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iraq and other
places. Despite barriers to transmission from donors to
recipients, factors like human population growth, travel,
and the legal and illegal poultry trade gradually weaken
these geographic and behavioral barriers [26]. This in-
creases direct avian-to-human transmission with no re-
combination or apparent mutation [30], generating
many human H5N1 cases such as in the severe situation
of Hong Kong in 1997. However, this transmission does
not mean that human-to-human transmission is also
common. This transmission is likely limited to relatives,
with no evident geographic clusters [31]. The character-
istics of not only donors and recipients, but also emer-
ging viruses, should be considered regarding human
transmission patterns [26]. There has been no more de-
tailed classification of host species, which may neglect
the expanding host range of H5N1 viruses and newly in-
fected host species. Pigs, for instance, are considered
candidates for generating reassortant strains and a sub-
sequent pandemic cause, because they have both avian
and human influenza sialic acid residue receptors in
their respiratory tracts [32]. Given data imperfections atthe host species level, we cannot address the issue of
whether the host range has expanded and pig-infecting
viruses of clade 2.2 have occurred. Finally, as mentioned
by Andrew and Glass [33], new host populations in
which the virus is endemic represent new risks of pan-
demic influenza in human beings, since the avian strain
is present year-round and may coincide with any human
influenza season. Based upon the above analysis, Egypt
declared the virus endemic in 2008, after having had a
large number of H5N1 clade 2.2 human cases during
2005–2011 (a new host population was isolated in 2006
for the first time). Therefore, we infer that there may be
a new risk of pandemic influenza in humans in Egypt.
Data limitations
Owning to the under-reporting and general bias in the
database considered, the four major global transmission
routes presented here are possible scenarios based on
evidence provided by our analysis. Thus, a well-
established and shared database of H5N1 outbreaks and
sequences is vital for further study and surveillance.
Conclusions
We located four major transmission routes of the clade
2.2 H5N1 virus with three sources; namely, Russia,
Mongolia, and the Middle East (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia)
in three consecutive years of 2005, 2006, and 2007. With
spatiotemporal transmission footprints along each route,
genetic distances to A/goose/Guangdong/1996 virus are
becoming significantly larger, leading to a more challen-
ging situation in certain regions such as Korea, India,
France, Germany, Nigeria, and Sudan. Europe and India
have had at least two incursions along multiple routes,
causing a mixed virus situation. In addition, spatiotempo-
ral distribution along the routes showed that 2007/2008
was a temporal separation point for the infection of differ-
ent host species; specifically, wild birds were the main host
from 2005 to 2007/2008 and poultry was responsible for
the genetic mutation in 2009–2011. “Global-to-local” and
“high-to-low latitude” transmission footprints have been
observed. Thus, both wild birds and poultry play import-
ant roles in transmission of the virus, but with different
spatial, temporal, and genetic dominance. Special attention
should be paid to countries along these transmission
routes.
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